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I. INTRODUCTION
Written laws guiding civil actions in the federal district courts
chiefly address the presentation, preparation and resolution of claims
involving parties. However, the courts often also consider claims in-
volving nonparties as well as nonclaim matters involving parties and
nonparties alike. Guidelines here mainly appear in federal precedents
and, to a lesser extent, in local court rules. They often follow in-state
court practices. The absence of written general laws for nonparty
claims and nonclaim matters often leads to unnecessary confusion and
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unfair procedures.' New, generally applicable written guidelines
could help reduce uncertainty and promote fairness. 2
To exemplify, we shall particularly explore possible reforms in
settlement conference settings where the interests of nonparty insur-
ers are at stake, as well as in adjudicatory settings where nonparty
insurers seek recoveries from proceeds obtained by their insureds as
party claimants. Before doing so, we will review briefly the major
forms of adjudicatory and ancillary powers over nonparty claims and
nonclaim matters not only to illustrate the absence of nonparty insur-
ers in written civil procedure laws, but also because any possible re-
forms must take account of these limited powers. We then shall
examine several settlement conference and adjudicatory authority
cases involving nonparty insurers that have prompted confusion and
unfairness. We conclude with suggestions on promoting fuller recog-
nition and participation of nonparty insurers in federal civil actions,
as well as with some thoughts on other nonparty claims and on non-
claim matters.
II. THE TREATMENT OF NONPARTY CLAIMS AND
NONCLAIM MATTERS IN WRITTEN FEDERAL
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION LAWS
Written general federal civil procedure laws treat claims between
parties and both nonparty claims and nonclaim matters differently.
These differences, and the resulting difficulties, are illustrated by the
guidelines for the federal district courts on initial and subsequent ad-
judicatory subject matter jurisdiction and on ancillary authority.3
1. Seemingly, the scope of written Federal Civil Procedure laws has influenced
the teaching of Federal Civil Procedure, a staple of first year legal education. Thus,
there is little attention paid in most basic civil procedure texts not only to resolutions of
nonparty claims, but also to other important civil practices unaddressed in writing, in-
cluding the validity of settlement pacts; settlement authority; settlement enforcement;
informal discovery, including ex parte communications, surveillance and tape-record-
ing; liens on judgment proceeds; and, the secrecy afforded certain civil litigation materi-
als. For suggestions on how these practices might be taught in advanced civil procedure
courses, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Evolving Views of Civil Litigation: Future Civil Proce-
dure Courses, 31 Amz. ST. L.J. 945 (1999).
2. While we strongly favor new general laws rather than local court rulemaking
initiatives on nonparty insurers, we question whether all new lawmaking should be
undertaken by rulemakers rather than Congress. A strong case on why rulemaking is
usually preferable is made in Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 889
(1999) ("[clourt rulemaking is better suited than legislation to the task of inferring gen-
eral principles from existing practice and designing an integrated system of rules based
on those principles").
3. For us, adjudicatory subject matter jurisdiction encompasses judicial power to
hear and resolve civil claims on the merits, while ancillary authority covers judicial
power necessary for courts to function successfully in adjudication. On occasion, courts
characterize all these powers as jurisdictional. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
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There are significant differences in the statutes on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts over claims between
parties and over nonparty claims. Such jurisdiction encompasses the
power to hear and resolve civil claims on the merits, at times with
juries. While such adjudicatory power exists over both claims between
parties and over nonparty claims, federal statutes typically address in
detail only initial adjudicatory power over claims between parties. As
well as by resolution through adjudication, claims in federal civil ac-
tions may be resolved with or without judicial assistance by settle-
ments. Where settlements are reached, they may involve not only
pending civil claims, but also civil claims that were never (and could
never have been) presented for adjudication. Jurisdiction to facilitate
settlements involving nonparty claims and to enforce any later
breaches (a form of subsequent adjudicatory power) typically is unad-
dressed in statute. In fact, statutes fail to speak much even to settle-
ment facilitation and enforcement proceedings involving claims
between named parties. Finally, many written civil procedure laws
speak to federal district court ancillary authority over nonclaim mat-
ters, such as sanctions for civil litigation misconduct, without differen-
tiating between the authority over parties and the authority over
nonparties, even though such distinctions often are crucial in deter-
mining the bounds of ancillary power.
As noted, initial adjudicatory power over claims between parties
is addressed almost wholly in statutes.4 Original (or independent or
freestanding) subject matter jurisdiction typically takes one of two
forms - diversity or federal question.5 These forms are described sepa-
rately in general statutory provisions, though there also exist special
and separate statutes for each.6 Supplemental (or pendent or depen-
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994) (stating that in addition to independent or
(original or freestanding) jurisdiction, usually involving diversity or federal question
claims, "ancillary jurisdiction" is available "for two, separate, though sometimes related
purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are .. .factually
interdependent ... and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is to manage
its proceedings, vindicate its authority and effectuate its decrees ...).
4. While initial adjudicatory jurisdiction seems comprehensively covered in Title
28 of the United States Code, at least some principles on the discretionary exercises of
this jurisdiction appear in federal precedents. Thus, discretion involving "supplemen-
tal" claims is guided by statute while discretion involving "abstention" is guided by case
law.
5. The American Law Institute has defined a "freestanding" claim as "a claim of
relief that is within the original jurisdiction of the district courts" independently of sup-
plemental jurisdiction. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REvI-
SION PROJECT at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2 April 14, 1998) (black letter and comments, not
annotations, approved by Institute members on May 14, 1998).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (describing general federal question subject matter
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (describing general diversity subject matter juris-
diction). But see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (2000) (describing special federal question law
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dent) subject matter jurisdiction over claims between parties is also
addressed in general statutory provisions. 7 Here, adjudicatory powers
over chiefly American state law claims are reliant upon some preexist-
ing or simultaneous original jurisdiction.
Federal district court subject matter jurisdiction to resolve non-
party claims and federal district court authority over nonclaim mat-
ters is addressed, for the most part, in federal case precedents. The
United States Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Kokkonen v. Guard-
ian Life Insurance Co. of Americas establishes the basic guidelines. 9
Here the Court said that in the absence of a statutory basis, a federal
district court could exercise "ancillary jurisdiction .. .for two, sepa-
rate, though sometimes related purposes: (1) to permit disposition by
a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, fac-
tually interdependent ... and (2) to enable a court to function success-
fully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority and
effectuate its decrees."10
After Kokkonen, federal subject matter jurisdiction over factually
interdependent nonparty claims was only partially addressed in the
general statutory provisions on supplemental jurisdiction. The provi-
sions seemingly permit jurisdiction over both claims between parties
and over nonparty claims, as they authorize "supplemental jurisdic-
tion" over "all" claims that are "so related" to the claims presented in
the civil action under diversity or federal question "original jurisdic-
tion that they form part of the same case or controversy."'1 Further,
the provisions do not demand expressly either that all supplemental
claims that are heard and that are capable of being joined actually be
for many civil rights claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2000) (describing special diversity law
for most interpleader claims).
7. For us this term includes both the pendent and the ancillary jurisdiction recog-
nized in federal precedents before the enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Unlike the diversity and federal question setting, with
supplemental claims there are few special statutory provisions. But see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) ("original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competi-
tion when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant
variety protection or trade-mark laws").
8. 11 U.S. 375 (1994).
9. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994) (After
exploring earlier precedents, the court concluded that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdic-
tion could "hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise.").
10. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000). The claims subject to supplemental jurisdiction in
the new American Law Institute project report are similar. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, supra note 5, at 1 (supplemental
claim "part of the same case or controversy under Article III" and "asserted in the same
civil action" as the related freestanding claim).
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pleaded or otherwise formally presented or that all supplemental
claims that are heard actually be capable of being joined.
1 2
Little else is addressed in the supplemental jurisdiction provi-
sions. For example, they do not recognize United States Supreme
Court precedents indicating that the ancillary adjudicatory power, al-
ways discretionary in nature, operates differently for "related" non-
party claims and for "related" claims between parties. The Court has
said that ancillary power over "factually interdependent" claims is less
available when the claims involve "parties not named in any claim
that is independently cognizable by the federal court" because such
claims are "fundamentally different."1 3 Beyond necessary related-
ness, as well as the considerations of "the convenience of the litigants"
and "judicial economy" that underlie all exercises of ancillary jurisdic-
tion, adjudicatory power over nonparty claims as well as over claims
against parties only joined through ancillary jurisdiction also require
"an examination of the posture" in which the claims were asserted and
of the specific statutes that confer original jurisdiction over claims be-
tween parties.
14
The supplemental jurisdiction statute specifically speaks to pos-
ture and a specific jurisdictional statute when it addresses at least one
type of claim joined against a party who is not subject to original ju-
risdiction. It disallows a plaintiff the opportunity to seek exercise of
adjudicatory power involving a third-party defendant under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") where original jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiffs claim against the defendant is founded on the
general diversity statute.15 Any such joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14
seemingly would involve a "factually interdependent" claim under
Kokkonen.
16
By contrast, the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not speak
at all to posture or to the preexisting original jurisdiction when subse-
12. In fact, even some original jurisdiction claims that are actually adjudicated are
not formally presented before trial in pleadings or other writings (e.g., pretrial confer-
ence orders). See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (Issues tried by "implied consent of the par-
ties ... treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings" and failure to
amend pleadings later "does not affect the result of the trial of these issues."); FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(c) (Except in default settings, judgment should grant appropriate relief to a
party "even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings.").
13. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
14. Finley, 490 U.S. at 551-52.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000) (also speaking to posture, in the setting of other
joinder rules, together with the general diversity stature, so that only potential named
parties are covered).
16. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a), the original plaintiff may join a claim against a
third-party defendant as long as the claim arises "out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against" an original defendant who had
earlier joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a), and perhaps supplemental jurisdiction, the
third-party defendant. FED R. Civ. P. 14(a).
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quent ancillary adjudicatory power is exercised over nonparty claims,
such as claims between prevailing plaintiffs and their attorneys. An-
cillary adjudicatory power over such nonparty claims is seemingly ap-
propriate, under Kokkonen, where the claims are "factually
interdependent" and, similarly, under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute, where the nonparty claims are "so related" to the claims pend-
ing between parties "that they form part of the same case or contro-
versy."17 While such nonparty claims often are adjudicated, there are
no written laws guiding federal district court discretion to adjudicate
nonparty claims involving fee and other (e.g., malpractice) disputes
between attorneys and their clients who are prevailing claimants.' 8
As well, the supplemental jurisdiction provisions do not address,
and the original (federal question and diversity) jurisdiction provi-
sions are usually not read to encompass, civil claims usually thought
to be outside traditional joinder (and thus pleading) rules, as they are
presented later in the case, often after all initial adjudicatory power
has disappeared. For example, subsequent adjudicatory power involv-
ing civil claims arising from breaches of settlement agreements were
recognized in Kokkonen as within the federal district court ancillary
jurisdiction under certain circumstances, presumedly embodying "dis-
position... of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factu-
ally interdependent." Adjudicatory power over settlement breaches is
not described in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, though discre-
tion seemingly is available as to its use; as well, pleading, joinder, and
other possibly relevant rules are silent. The resolution of settlement
disputes involves hearing procedures on civil claims quite different
from the procedures guiding initial adjudicatory power over civil
claims. The court in Kokkonen also suggests settlement breaches may
be reviewed in several other ways, as under the federal court ancillary
authority over nonclaim matters when court "authority" is vindicated
through criminal contempt punishment of those who breach (as there
are violations of court orders) and when court "decrees" are effectu-
ated through coercive contempt proceedings.
Nonparty claims adjudicated in federal civil actions often involve
insurers. At times, the insurers, as nonparties, seek judicial remedies
from existing parties, as when they place liens on the proceeds of any
17. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (stating that the Court had asserted ancillary
jurisdiction with the purpose to allow a single court to determine "factually interdepen-
dent" claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (stating that a district court has supplemental
jurisdiction where nonparty claims are "so related" to the claims pending between the
parties "that they form part of the same case or controversy").
18. On the exercise of discretionary adjudicatory jurisdiction over such claims, see
Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1988), stating




judgments or out-of-court settlements these parties may obtain as
claimants. 19 Conceivably, similar remedies may even be pursued by
nonparty insurers against other nonparties; for example, nonparty in-
surers of plaintiffs may seek to resolve claims against nonparty insur-
ers of defendants that are "related" to the pending claims between
plaintiffs and defendants.
20
Nonparty insurers can also be bound to federal court judgments
rendered against their insureds as party defendants. Judgments
against insureds who were defendants often are binding on their non-
party insurers as long as the insurers' defense duties were properly
noticed, the insureds' cooperation duties were adequately met, and
there arose no insurance coverage issues. Judgments against named
insureds may bind their nonparty insurers even where these insurers
could not have been formally joined as codefendants or otherwise.
Statutory guidelines seemingly also do little to address the ancil-
lary authority under Kokkonen over nonclaim matters that allows a
federal court to "function successfully, that is, to manage its proceed-
ings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees."2 1 As with
nonparty claims, nonclaim matters may involve nonparty insurers.
To manage its proceedings a federal district court may wish to order
the attendance of a nonparty insurer at a settlement conference under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. To vindicate its authority the court may wish to
sanction a nonparty insurer that fails to comply with such an order.
And, to effectuate its decree the court may wish to order the nonparty
insurer to comply with a settlement incorporated into a final
judgment.
While statutes are relatively silent, many court rules speak to the
ancillary authority necessary for federal district courts to function
19. While such liens may not arise from the "same group of circumstances" as the
claims of the insureds against third parties, the liens "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact" and would "ordinarily be expected" to be tried "in one judicial proceed-
ing" that also involves the insureds' claims. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (rejecting as a guideline for ancillary jurisdiction (over "factu-
ally interdependent" claims as later described in Kokkonen) a test involving "the same
group of circumstances" as it was "unnecessarily grudging").
20. This can occur where nonparty insurers of individual plaintiffs are assigned
parts of their insureds' claims against individual defendants which then may be pur-
sued directly against the defendants' insurers.
21. But see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) (establishing attorney's fee awards
against an "attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases" for unreasonable and
vexatious multiplication of federal court proceedings). While statutes are relatively si-
lent, the Fed R. Civ. P. do provide significant guidance, at least as to nonclaim matters
involving the vindication of federal district court authority. See e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 11;
FED. R. CIv. P. 16; FED. R. CIv. P. 37. See also Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (stating
that the United States Supreme Court has "asserted ancillary jurisdiction ... to func-
tion successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectu-
ate its decrees ...).
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successfully. Yet too often parties and nonparties are not properly dis-
tinguished in these rules, causing confusion and unfairness. For ex-
ample, to manage its proceedings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) now permits a
district court to "direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepre-
sented parties" as well as a "representative" of a party to appear
before it for a settlement conference. It is unclear under this rule
whether and when nonparty insurers may be directed. As well, to vin-
dicate its authority, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) now allows a district court to
sanction "a party or a party's attorney" for settlement conference mis-
conduct. It is unclear whether nonparty insurers may be sanctioned
under this rule, assuming their attendance may be compelled or is ac-
tually effected.
The differing treatment in written federal civil procedure laws of
claims between parties and of both nonparty claims and nonclaim
matters is illustrated in the statutory guidelines on ancillary subject
matter jurisdiction and ancillary authority. The relative absence of
written civil procedure laws covering nonparty claims and nonclaim
matters here and elsewhere has led to unnecessary confusion and un-
fortunate inequalities. 22 The troubles are well exemplified in cases
involving federal district judges who exercise ancillary authority
under Kokkonen by directing the attendance of nonparty insurers at
settlement conferences and who exercise ancillary jurisdiction by
resolving subrogation claims of nonparty insurers. We now look to a
few such cases because the challenges are significant, run deep, are
easily understood, operate in arenas of considerable practical import,
and can significantly be remedied through new written laws.
III. COMPELLING THE ATTENDANCE OF NONPARTY
INSURERS AT SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES
Nonparty insurers frequently play important roles in settlements
of federal civil actions. Their unpleaded interests in the monetary re-
coveries of their insureds certainly often influence settlement out-
comes. Additionally, their duties involving defense costs and
judgment payments on behalf of their insureds named as defendants
22. Lament over the dearth of written laws on federal district court subject matter
jurisdiction over nonparty claims and nonclaim matters is expressed in Jeffrey A. Par-
ness & Daniel J. Sennott, Expanded Recognition in Written Laws of Ancillary Federal
Court Powers: Supplementing the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, U. PirT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (suggesting reforms of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367) (general lament over dearth of other written federal civil procedure laws
on nonparty claims and nonclaim matters is expressed in Jeffrey A. Parness & Daniel J.
Sennott, Recognizing Party and Nonparty Interests in Written Civil Procedure Laws, 20




also significantly affect settlements.2 3 While federal district judges
are expressly encouraged to facilitate settlements, their ancillary au-
thority under Kokkonen over nonparty insurers at settlement confer-
ences remains uncertain, thus deterring some courts from functioning
more successfully. 24 Consider existing written civil procedure laws as
analyzed in the two major federal court precedents.
The guidelines for pretrial settlement conferences in the federal
district courts are contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. It provides that
courts may direct the attorneys for any party and any unrepresented
party to appear at a pretrial conference for the purpose of "facilitating
the settlement of the case."25 The rule further permits courts to "take
appropriate action" with respect to settlement, including "the use of
special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute."26 Finally, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 16 allows courts to issue controlling orders after pretrial
conferences and, when appropriate, to impose sanctions for failures to
comply with court orders or to appear at scheduled conferences "sub-
stantially" prepared to participate fully.2 7 Problems have arisen con-
cerning the ancillary authority of federal district courts to direct and
sanction nonparties, such as insurers, even when they effectively con-
trol the litigation for the named parties. Thus, there have been
problems when nonparty insurers withhold full settlement authority
from either their insureds, who are named defendants, or the in-
sureds' attorneys. 28 Because federal courts are not expressly permit-
ted to direct or sanction nonparties, three distinct approaches have
developed regarding the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 to compel the
appearance of nonparty insurers.
29
23. For example, plaintiffs seemingly will settle for less with the defendants' insur-
ers (who may possess settlement authority if there are viable insurance policies and no
coverage issues) when serious questions are raised about either coverage or adequate
and timely notice to the insurers of the civil actions.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (stating that a court may direct parties to participate in a
conference for the purpose of facilitating settlement of the dispute).
25. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a)(5).
26. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(5).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e) (stating that courts shall issue controlling orders after
pretrial conferences); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (stating that a court can impose sanctions for
failure to comply with court orders or to appear at scheduled conferences "substantially"
prepared to participate fully).
28. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1405-06 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting two settings
where "pretrial conference participants, through no fault of their own, are not fully pre-
pared to discuss settlement;" one instance involves nonparty insurers "in charge" of the
litigation for some of the parties who maintain "full settlement authority," while the
other - addressed in Fed R. Civ. P. 16 since 1993 - involves represented parties who
retain "full settlement authority" but who send only their attorneys to settlement
conferences).
29. An earlier analysis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 authority and suggestions for changes
(including express recognition of nonparty insurers) appears in Jeffrey A. Parness &
20031
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The first method of applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 to nonparty insur-
ers who possess settlement .authority, demonstrated by the majority
opinion in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,3° recognizes
judicial power to direct appearances under the "inherent power" to
govern proceedings, seemingly a form of the ancillary authority recog-
nized under Kokkonen to insure that courts function successfully. For
the majority in G. Heileman Brewing Co., Judge Kanne wrote for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that while
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 did not then expressly authorize the courts to com-
pel the attendance of nonparties at pretrial proceedings, the Fed. R.
Civ. P. did not "completely describe and limit the power of the federal
courts." 31 Judge Kanne reasoned that the absence of language in any
rule expressly authorizing certain power did not necessarily bar exer-
cising such power. 32 Judge Kanne explained that written civil proce-
dure laws only "form and shape certain aspects of a court's inherent
power" and thus may allow the exercise of unwritten power, though
any "inherent authority" should only be exercised "to make the opera-
tion of the court more efficient, to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process, and to control courts' dockets.3 3 Judge Kanne found the
breadth of inherent power, "derived from the very nature and exis-
tence" of the judicial office, spans the "broad field over which the Fed.
R. Civ. P. are applied."3 4 He concluded: "[i]nherent authority remains
the means by which district judges deal with circumstances not pro-
scribed or specifically addressed by rule or statute, but which must be
Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial Con-
ference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347 (2002).
30. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane). G. Heileman Brewing Co. involved an
appeal of sanctions imposed when the corporate defendant, Joseph Oat, failed to comply
with a trial court directive for the defendant to produce a corporate agent with full
settlement authority at a pretrial settlement conference. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1989). Joseph Oat appealed arguing that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 provided authority for the court to compel appearances by the attor-
neys of represented parties and any unrepresented parties but not by the employees or
representatives of a represented party. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 650.
While G. Heileman Brewing Co. dealt specifically with a court's authority to direct the
attendance of a represented party, its analysis is germane to issues involving court au-
thority over nonparty insurers. Id.
31. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir.
1989).
32. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 651. Judge Kanne did observe that inher-
ent powers may not be exercised "in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute." Id. at
652.
33. Id. at 652 (stating that the rules form and shape certain aspects of a court's
inherent powers); id. at 651 (stating that the procedural techniques are designed to
make the operation of the court more efficient to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process, and to control the court's dockets). Judge Kanne did observe that inherent
powers may not be exercised "in a manner inconsistent with rule or statute." Id. at 652.
34. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 653.
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addressed to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action."
35
The second method, found in the dissents in G. Heileman Brewing
Co., requires a strict reading of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, usually resulting in
no federal court power that is not expressly referenced in written
laws. In one dissent, Judge Richard Allen Posner recognized "obvious
dangers in too broad an interpretation of the federal courts' inherent
power" to promote settlement, including the danger that because peo-
ple retain attorneys to "economize on their own investment of time in
resolving disputes," there is a risk that judges using inherent power
may override a party's judgment and "ignore the value of other peo-
ples' time" in their eagerness to settle cases. 36 Judge Posner found
this danger present in G. Heileman Brewing Co., as the defendant
"had made it clear" that it did not intend to pay any money in settle-
ment, thus making it unlikely that compelling the defendant to send a
representative to a settlement conference would yield positive results.
In their separate dissenting opinions, both Judges John Louis
Coffey and Kenneth Francis Ripple also favored a strict reading of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. Judge Coffey expressed concerns about the ten-
sions between broad district court inherent authority to facilitate set-
tlement and the powers of Congress and the United States Supreme
Court to promulgate uniform federal procedural law standards. 37 He
also warned that use of "inherent authority" in the case posed due
process problems as it circumvented the subpoena process that affords
summoned parties the opportunity to be heard on motions to quash.
38
Judge Ripple noted that a broad interpretation of "inherent authority"
would encourage each individual court to "march to the beat of its own
drummer."
39
The third method, demonstrated in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, reasons that a nonparty insurer or its
agent could be compelled indirectly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 to appear
at a pretrial conference by virtue of its involvement in pending litiga-
tion on behalf of its insured.40 The court failed to address the argu-
ment that district court authority to order Novak, a senior claims
analyst for the defendant's insurer, to appear at a settlement confer-
ence derived from the "inherent power" to effectuate Fed. R. Civ. P. 16
35. Id.
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting). See also id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 660.
39. Id. at 666.
40. Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1408 (1991). The case involved an appeal of sanctions
imposed on Roger Novak, a senior claims analyst for the defendant's insurer, for failing




as such authority was unnecessary. 4 1 Instead, the court reasoned
that because the legal and financial interests of the named defendant
and its insurer were "aligned" (the insurer being contractually bound
to pay any judgment entered against the insured), an order directing
the insured as a party to produce a person with full settlement author-
ity could effectively "coerce cooperation" from a nonparty insurer, as
an agent of the defendant/insured, at settlement talks.42
Each of these methods of applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 to nonparty
insurers presents problems. The first, an "inherent power" approach,
embodies broad judicial discretion, with the likelihood of divergent
precedents and inconsistent standards. The second, a plain language
approach, forecloses the possibility of compelling the appearance of
any nonparty, no matter how key its role is in settlement, if the non-
party is not expressly recognized in the rule. This can make a pretrial
settlement conference an exercise in futility when full settlement au-
thority is not vested in the attending attorneys and/or parties, with
the likely result being wasted judicial resources and increased litiga-
tion costs. Finally, an indirect approach, whereby a nonparty insurer
is deemed an agent of the party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, not only
stretches the rule uncomfortably, but also is particularly troublesome
where the interests of the nonparty insurer and the insured are not
aligned, as when there is a dispute about policy coverage. 43 A simple
solution is to amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 to include guidelines expressly
addressing ancillary authority over nonparty insurers. Such guide-
lines should eliminate difficult inquiries into ambiguously written
laws, inherent power, and back door techniques.
Ironically, written guidelines covering nonparty insurers were
proposed in 1993 when Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 was last revised. A rejected
1993 proposal to amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 stated a "court may require
that parties, or their representatives or insurers, attend a conference
41. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1408. The court upheld the finding of criminal contempt,
though grounded on an unavailable inherent authority, because the district court's or-
der was "neither transparently invalid nor patently frivolous" so as to allow a person to
disobey it with impunity. Id. at 1408-09.
42. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1408 (assuming settlement authority remained with the
insurer).
43. As with the three judicial methods on applying Fed R. Civ. P. 16, commentators
have disagreed on the best general approach to judicial interpretations of the federal
civil procedure rules. Compare Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Inter-
preting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093, 1097 (1993)
("The Court has greater power to interpret Rules than it does to interpret Statutes,"
allowing it to play a "formative role" when applying the rules.), with Catherine T.
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1101-02 (2002) ("Congress' delegation of rulemaking authority
should constrain rather than liberate, Court's interpretation of the Rules;" thus Judge
Moore's "more dynamic approach" should be rejected.).
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to consider possibilities of settlement."44 Notwithstanding this rejec-
tion, some federal courts have similar local rules. For instance, the
Local Rules for the Eastern District of Michigan say that "at all con-
ferences designated as settlement conferences, all parties shall be pre-
sent, including, in the case of a party represented by an insurer, a
claim representative with authority adequate for responsible and ef-
fective participation in the conference." 45 Likewise, the Western Dis-
trict of Michigan has a local rule saying "in cases where an insured
party does not have full settlement authority, an official of the insurer
with authority to negotiate a settlement may be required to attend."
4 6
While such local rules certainly help, the need for similar general
written federal guidelines is clear.4 7 A case-by-case or court-by-court
approach to ancillary authority over nonparty insurers in settlement
conference settings invites divergent and conflicting practices. New
general rules should, however, go beyond the noted local rules, as the
local rules neither speak to the participatory rights of nonparty insur-
ers nor recognize the necessary bounds of discretion, as does the sup-
plemental jurisdiction statute.
Newly formulated federal rules governing the pretrial participa-
tion of nonparty insurers in settlement talks must recognize broad
discretion for the purpose of facilitating the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive resolutions of civil actions while simultaneously providing at least
some guidance on the limits of such discretion. Any new rule involv-
ing nonparty insurers must account for consideration of the likelihood
of settlement, the need to maintain judicial impartiality, and the
value of people's time.
4 8
44. 137 F.R.D. 53, 85 (1991) (Proposed Rules).
45. U.S. DIST. CT., E.D. MICH. LOCAL R. 16.1(c).
46. U.S. DIST. CT., W.D. MICH. LOCAL R. 16.8. It may be these Michigan federal
court rules are tied to MICH. CT. R. 2.401(F) (1985) (Where "meaningful discussion of
settlement is anticipated," court holding pretrial conference may direct persons with
authority to settle to be present, including "agents of parties, representatives of lien
holders, or representatives of insurance carriers.").
47. The general guidelines need not, as in the Michigan local rules, expressly cover
insurers. For example, U.S. DIST. CT., C.D. ILL., LOCAL R. 16.1(B) says, in part:
The presiding judge may order the parties to submit to settlement conferences
at any time if it appears that a case may be resolved by settlement. The settle-
ment conference will be by personal appearance unless otherwise directed by
the presiding judge. In addition to the attorney responsible for the actual trial
of the case, someone with final settlement authority shall be required to attend
the settlement conference, either in person or by telephone.
Id. .
48. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 657-65.
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IV. RESOLVING THE SUBROGATION CLAIMS OF NONPARTY
INSURERS AGAINST THEIR INSUREDS
Beyond compelled attendance at settlement conferences, difficul-
ties arise in federal civil actions regarding the breadth of ancillary
subject matter jurisdiction over the affirmative claims of nonparty in-
surers that are factually related to the original plaintiffs claims. Such
nonparty claims usually involve nonparty insurers seeking recoveries
from their insureds of expenses paid on behalf of these insureds who
are then seeking recoveries of these same expenses, and others, from
third-parties.
49
At times defendants seek to join such nonparty insurers as co-
plaintiffs. 50 When they do, troubles often arise under Fed. R. Civ. P.
17 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) says
that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest."51 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(2)(ii) states that
persons claiming an interest in the subject of a civil action shall be
joined if their absence may "leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest."52 Where a
plaintiffs recovery is subject to a contractual subrogation right of a
nonparty insurer, the insurer arguably is a "real party at interest"
claiming an interest in "the subject" of the action. 53 Generally, a de-
fendant will seek to join a nonparty insurer for two reasons. First, it
is worried about possible double liability if the plaintiff runs off with
judgment proceeds without paying the nonparty insurer. 54 Second,
the defendant hopes to reduce sympathy for the plaintiff by informing
49. Of course, an insured will usually not sue if most or all of any recovery will
likely go to a nonparty insurer. See Draper v. Aceto, 33 P.3d 479, 479 (Cal. 2001) (Em-
ployee and employee's attorney get nothing from settlement with tortfeasor as employer
received all proceeds in order to cover workers' compensation benefits earlier paid to the
employee.).
50. Interestingly, nonparty insurers have been joined as co-defendants by a plain-
tiff. Vandervest v. Wisconsin Central Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (Join-
der "solely to protect their subrogated interests;" codefendants are not "real parties in
interest" so their citizenship does not matter in the plaintiffs diversity action.).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 17.
52. FED. R. Crv. P. 19.
53. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 are often used together since a party
whose joinder is necessary to protect the interests and rights of persons already parties
to the suit from multiple obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 will often be deemed a real
party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17.
54. Thus, a defendant will not usually turn over settlement monies to a plaintiff
whose subrogated nonparty insurer has not released the defendant from any future lia-
bility. See, e.g., Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65-67 (D. Mass. 1999) (insurer of
defendant would not pay because plaintiff and her sister, an unnamed party who also
settled with the defendant, had not arranged for the payment of an outstanding lien on
settlement proceeds to one of the sisters).
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the fact finder, often a jury, that at least a portion of any recovery will
be paid to an insurer.5 5 In the absence of written guidelines, federal
courts have handled these joinder issues inconsistently, though usu-
ally finding them governed by uniform federal law standards.
5 6
One such "real party in interest" case is Story v. Pioneer Housing
Systems, Inc.57 In denying the defendant's motion to add the plain-
tiffs insurer as real party in interest, the court in Story held that even
if there existed a contractual subrogation right of a nonparty insurer,
the defendant could be protected against any risk of multiple liability
under the precedent of Dudley v. Smith.58 There, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected a defendant's assertion
that under the United States Supreme Court holding in United States
v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co.,59 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii) directs the
joinder of a plaintiffs insurer. In Dudley, the court suggested that
"any multiplicity of suit risk can be obviated" through the use of a
trust in favor of the person claiming the right to subrogation.
60
Other federal courts, however, have demanded the joinder of non-
party insurers who have such subrogation rights. In Sikora v. AFD
Industries Inc.,6 1 an Illinois federal district court held that an em-
ployer with subrogation rights involving workers compensation bene-
fits must be joined as a real party in interest in the plaintiff/
employee's product liability action. While reluctant to require joinder
of a partial subrogee under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), the court felt com-
pelled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
55. But see June F. Entman, Compulsory Joinder of Compensating Insurers: Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and the Role of Substantive Law, 45 CASE. W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 69-71 (1994) (finding possible jury prejudice a "non-problem" because a jury
need not know of an insurer's interest even if the insurer "is named in the pleadings").
See also GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-7(d) (Supp. 2002) (insurer is "unnamed party not dis-
closed to jury").
56. But see Entman, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. at 72-80 ("[u]nsatisfactory situation"
involving conflicting Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 federal decisions "arises in
large part because federal courts do not permit the substantive law of subrogation, often
that of a state, to play its rightful role in determining the parties to the suit.").
57. 191 F.R.D. 653 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
58. 504 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1975).
59. 338 U.S. 366 (1949). The Supreme Court said in Aetna that "although either
the subrogee or subrogor may sue, joinder may be compelled upon timely motion."
United States v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1949). The Dudley
Court distinguished Aetna on the grounds that in Aetna the Court compelled joinder of
insureds where three plaintiffs were insurers who proceeded as partial subrogees. Dud-
ley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1974). The Dudley Court suggested that when
a civil action was brought by an insured for the full amount of the loss, joinder of the
insurer may be unnecessary. Dudley, 504 F.2d at 983. The Dudley court also noted that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 has been amended in relevant parts since the Aetna ruling. Id.
60. Dudley, 504 F.2d at 983 (citing Brainiff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D.
141 (D. Minn. 1957)).
61. 18 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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holding in Wadsworth v. United States Postal Service 62 where the ap-
pellate court, looking to Aetna (the case distinguished in Dudley), held
that when asserting a claim in which an insurer had a subrogation
interest, the plaintiff must join the insurer under Fed. R. Civ. P.
17(a).63 In recognizing that it was "not writing on a blank slate," the
court in Sikora found the Wadsworth precedent compelled joinder of
the subrogee.
6 4
Application of the Aetna precedent continues to cause confusion. 65
New written civil procedure laws could provide the federal judiciary
with express guidelines for determining if and when nonparty insur-
ers with subrogation rights should be joined, prompting either federal
procedural laws similarly applied nationally or federal court use of in-
state practices. These guidelines should cover not only joinder or con-
structive trust principles, but also supplemental jurisdiction princi-
ples. Since disputes over the subrogation rights of nonparty insurers
seemingly should not always be adjudicated when the insureds' claims
against third-parties are resolved, and since the dividing lives are un-
clear, written directions on proper exercises of, and restraints on, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction are needed.6 6
V. REFORMING OTHER CIVIL PROCEDURE LAWS
INVOLVING NONPARTY INSURERS
The ancillary authority of federal district courts to compel the at-
tendance of nonparty insurers (including those with interests in plain-
tiffs' proceeds and those who defend and indemnify defendants) at
settlement conferences should be addressed in written civil procedure
laws, as should the adjudicatory power of these courts over certain
62. 511 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1975).
63. Sikora v. AFD Indus. Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 841, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (expressing
the court's reluctance under Rule 17(a) to add a partial subrogee) (The trial court was
also reluctant to require the joinder of the plaintiffs employer because the court agreed
with the plaintiffs assertion that the defendant was seeking joinder primarily to over-
come a statute of limitations defense on a contribution claim the defendant sought to
make against the employer.); Wadsworth v. United States Postal Service, 511 F.2d 64,
65-66 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating that under the real-party-in-interest rule an insurer hav-
ing paid a portion of a loss must be joined as a plaintiff).
64. Sikora, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
65. June F. Entman, More Reasons for Abolishing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a): The Problem of the Proper Plaintiff and Insurance Subrogation, 68 N.C. L. REV.
893 (1990); Entman, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. at 1.
66. For example, where a plaintiff/insured's claims against a third-party are set-
tled early on, but where any subrogation claim foreseeably will require a trial, or at
least extensive pretrial activity prior to settlement, discretionary dismissal of the non-
party insurer's subrogation claim seems appropriate where a state forum is also availa-
ble, convenient, conversant in state insurance laws, and expeditious in civil case




affirmative civil claims presented by nonparty insurers in federal civil
actions. Elsewhere, there may be similar difficulties and a compara-
ble need for new, generally applicable written laws.
For example, as noted earlier, it is now uncertain whether and
how nonparty insurers may be subject to the ancillary sanctioning au-
thority of the federal courts for misconduct involving pretrial settle-
ment conferences. 67 Similarly, it is unclear whether nonparty
insurers may be sanctioned if they are chiefly "responsible" for viola-
tions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (involving "paper" presentations), of formal
discovery rules, or of court orders involving formal discovery. 68 Be-
cause these written federal civil procedure laws are unclear, it may be
that certain state civil practice duties for insurers, embodied in sub-
stantive insurance law statutes, must apply in the federal district
courts.6 9 It may also be that certain state professional conduct stan-
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) speaks only to "orders" involving "a party or party's attor-
ney." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f). But see In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 757-58 (6th Cir. 1974)
(suggesting that sometimes nonparty insurers and their agents may be pursued in crim-
inal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 for settlement conference misconduct). Of course,
where an insurer's good faith settlement duties arise once a third-party claim is
presented, even before any lawsuit, prelawsuit duties seem best handled under relevant
state laws. Haddick v. Valor Ins., 763 N.E.2d 299, 303 (Ill. 2001) (describing prelawsuit
duties of insurers).
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c) (stating that a court may impose sanctions on a party that
has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (stating that an unsigned "paper"
will be stricken unless promptly corrected). Formal discovery papers are not included.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (relating to presentations). Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b) expressly allows certain sanctions involving such violation to be directed only
against a "party," an "officer, director, or managing agent of a party," or "the attorney
advising" the party who fails to act properly. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)
expressly permits certain sanctions involving failures to obey court orders involving for-
mal discovery be directed only against "a party," "an officer director or managing agent
of a party," "a person designated.., to testify on behalf of a party," "a deponent," or "the
attorney advising" the party who fails to obey a court order involving formal discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
69. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (state practices applicable if fo-
rum shopping concerns and equal protection denials are significant). Seemingly, often
questions involving choosing federal or state law standards are avoided because the
standards are similar. We do not discuss herein either the Tenth Amendment federal
constitutional limits on Congressional control of nonparty insurers interested in federal
civil actions or the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (rules shall not enlarge,
abridge or modify substantive rights) limits on federal civil procedure rulemaking by
the U.S. Supreme Court. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201(13) (2001) (in title on
insurance and insurance companies, a statutory bar on insurers who "fail to promptly
settle claims, if liability has become reasonably clear, under one portion of the insurance
policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance
policy coverage."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201(6) ("neglect to attempt in good faith to
effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has be-
come reasonably clear"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242(1) ("Insured or a third-party
claimant has an independent cause of action against an insurer for actual damages




dards for insurance adjusters, embodied in lawyer conduct provisions,
must also apply in federal courts.70
Also, as described earlier, neither the supplemental jurisdiction
statute nor other written law speaks to posture or preexisting original
jurisdiction when ancillary adjudicatory power is exercised directly
over certain nonparty claims, including claims involving nonparty in-
surers resolved on the merits following considerations of discretion. 71
Should such power regularly be exercised over nonparty insurers with
liens (or other asserted interests) on any proceeds to plaintiffs or over
nonparty insurers involved in insurance coverage or bad faith dis-
putes with named defendants that are factually related to pending
civil claims? 72 Seemingly these questions require independent an-
swers from federal lawmakers, as they concern federal district court
subject matter jurisdiction operating within constitutionally-limited
adjudicatory power.
Further, when such discretionary adjudicatory power is exercised
over nonparty claims, how should nonparty claims involving insur-
ance be set forth (as they are not presented in pleadings) and other-
wise processed? While certain of these process questions appear
capable of resolution by simply referencing in-state civil procedure
practices, the Seventh Amendment jury trial right will prompt inde-
70. See, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1075-76 (Wash. 2002) (stating
that insurance claims adjusters, when preparing and completing documents which af-
fect the legal rights of third party claimants and when advising third parties to sign
such documents, must comply with the standard of care of a practicing attorney;" court
does not decide whether such activities by adjusters constitute the unauthorized prac-
tice of law as no one asked the court to enjoin or prohibit the acts of adjusters).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Other factors relevant to the possible disposition of claims
involving nonparty insurers within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("so related to
claims in the action with such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution") are noted in the
statute, though they are quite general in nature. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (Disposi-
tion should be declined where, e.g., there is "a novel or complex issue of State law" or an
"exceptional" circumstance.).
72. With insurance coverage or bad faith claims, as contrasted with nonparty
claims involving the liens of insurers, more difficulties seemingly will arise with exer-
cises of ancillary (or even original) adjudicatory power as the very strong state govern-
mental interests in regulating insurers' interactions with their insureds are often in
play. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to ... im-
pair... any law enacted by any State for.., regulating the business of insurance...
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance."). See generally Hartz
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Maryland has made a con-
sidered decision not to recognize a tort action for bad faith failure to settle with an
insured," opting for an administrative process). See also M. DeMatteo Const. Co. v.
Century Indemnity Co., 182 F. Supp. 146, 160 (D. Mass. 2001) (claim fails where Insur-




pendent federal practices in response to other questions. 7 3 Yet other
questions may prompt resolutions referencing in-state lawyer profes-
sional conduct standards or in-state substantive insurance company
standards. 74 Additionally, certain questions may require a "uniform
federal standard" that should not "give way to contrary local policies,"
where a national norm is then implemented through either Fed. R.
Civ. P. amendment or statutory initiative.
7 5
Finally, there is little written federal civil procedure law on the
exercise of what might be called the indirect ancillary adjudicatory
power over nonparty claims involving insurers. For example, at times
a nonparty insurer of a named defendant may be bound by a civil
court judgment against its insured. 76 Thus, resjudicata can make the
nonparty insurer financially responsible for a judgment against its in-
73. In-state civil procedure practices on setting forth nonparty claims involving in-
surance seemingly would be more likely used, if their use was not already demanded by
Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 75 (state law employed when federal courts resolve state law
claims where "uniformity in the administration of the law of the state" is necessary),
where they facilitate proper federal court application of state substantive law (as when
the procedures are tied to the "made whole" doctrine which limits recoveries by non-
party insurers asserting certain liens), while independent federal civil procedure laws
would more likely be employed where uniformity of practices in all federal district
courts appears necessary and would not undermine the enforcement of state substan-
tive laws. Federal court facilitation of the enforcement of state insurance laws and their
underlying policies is urged in 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) ("The business of insurance, and
every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.") and 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) ("No Act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance"); See, e.g., Poole v. Gwin, Lewis &
Punches, LLP, 792 So. 2d 987, 991 (Miss. 2001) (finding no jury trial right in Mississippi
state courts when discharged contingent fee attorney sues former client in quantum
meruit for fees, though such a right arises in a federal district civil action under Webb v.
B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., 174 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 1999)).
74. See generally FLA. R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 4-
1.8(j) (2002 & Supp. 2002) (requires insurance defense lawyers, in personal injury and
property damage tort cases not involving government and where insurers foot the bill,
to provide clients with a "Statement of Insured Client's Rights," which includes informa-
tion on fees and costs; litigation guidelines; confidentiality; conflicts of interest; settle-
ment; and, the right to hire one's own lawyer). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-
201(13).
75. Consider, for example, questions involving the extent, if any, that a lawyer for
a defendant/insured may simultaneously represent the nonparty insurer where the in-
sured consents and the interests of the insured and insurer are aligned. See, e.g., Pine
Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad and Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. 2002)
(state laws differ, with some saying an insured is always the sole client of defense law-
yer paid for by the insurer).
76. The guiding principle was set out in Hartford Ins. Co. v. Henderson & Son, Inc.,
371 S.E.2d 401, 402 (Ga. 1988) where the court said:
The general rule is that because there is no privity of contract, a party may not
bring a direct action against the liability insurer of the party who allegedly
caused the damages unless there is an unsatisfied judgment against the in-
sured or it is specifically permitted either by statute or a provision in the policy.
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sured (at least to the insurance policy limits) as long as the insured
meets its contractual duties involving cooperation and the nonparty
insurer can significantly control, per the insurance contract, the de-
fense where there are no policy coverage questions. 7 7 A comparable
res judicata effect may also arise even where the insured runs off and
thus fails to cooperate, as long as the plaintiff sufficiently informs the
nonparty insurer of the pending civil action against the departed de-
fendant/insured and the nonparty insurer has adequate opportunity
to be heard on any policy coverage questions and on any questions
involving its insured's acts. 78 Here, the nature of the plaintiffs bur-
den of informing the nonparty insurer and the nature of any hearing
generally should be governed by federal civil procedure laws which do
not follow in-state practices because uniform practices among all fed-
eral district courts are usually desirable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nonparty insurers often participate in federal civil actions. Some-
times nonparty claims involving insurers are adjudicated. Other
times ancillary authority is exercised over nonparty insurers in order
that the federal district courts may function successfully. While they
are frequently present, their participation is infrequently addressed in
written federal civil procedure laws. Exemplary are the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction statutes. As a result, difficulties have arisen regard-
ing the participatory rights of nonparty insurers in federal cases. In
particular, there has been trouble with the ancillary authority to di-
rect the attendance of nonparty insurers at settlement conferences
and with the ancillary adjudicatory powers over the interests of non-
party insurers in recoveries by their insureds who are named plain-
tiffs. New written federal civil procedure laws addressing varying
forms of participation by nonparty insurers in federal civil actions
77. Res judicata effects at times are accomplished statutorily through require-
ments on insurance contracts rather than through common law precedents. See, e.g.,
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2) (West 1988); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2000).
Where there are alleged failures, as with the insured's alleged lack of cooperation or
timely notice, states differ on who carries the burden of proof on prejudice to the in-
surer. Compare Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 223 (Colo. 2001)
(stating that the insurer bears burden to show prejudice), with Alcazar v. Hayes, 982
S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that prejudice to insurer is often presumed, but may
be rebutted by the insured). See also Phillips Way v. American, 795 A.2d 216 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2002) (noting that under statutes, prejudice needed where insured fails to
cooperate with insurer when third party sues insurer, but not when insured sues
insurer).
78. See, e.g., Vega v. Gore, 730 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (no such effect where
insurer received actual notice of civil action against insured after entry of a default
judgment).
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would be helpful. We have suggested a few reforms. We hope they
and others will be discussed by the Congress and by the drafters of the
federal civil procedure rules.
